We examine the contracting and negotiation process in mergers using an incomplete contracts framework. Our multi-period model allows for the arrival of new information and renegotiation after the signing of an initial merger agreement but before deal completion or termination. A properly designed initial contract solves the holdup problem during renegotiation and induces higher dealspecific effort, including the due diligence assessment of the deal. The contract grants an option to the target to terminate the merger, where the strike on the option compensates the acquirer's deal-specific effort without imposing excessive costs on the target for pursuing non-merger alternatives. The option strike can be implemented by the use of deal protection devices, such as a target termination fee and/or an acquirer lockup. Employing a large sample of stock mergers, we find evidence supporting model predictions for the renegotiation of contracts, deal outcomes and the use of deal protection devices.
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I. Introduction
The outcome of a large-scale merger depends on the bilateral bargaining between the target and acquiring firms' executives and their advisors. After the signing of an initial merger agreement, but prior to the anticipated deal completion date, managers and investors continue to receive important new information regarding deal and firm values. During this time, significant effort and expense is also invested in plans to combine the firms, which also can reveal new information about expected synergies and risks. 1 Our paper shows that the arrival of post-signing information and the potential for deal renegotiation have significant impact on the ex-ante design of the merger contract and the final outcomes of mergers.
Given the length of time needed to complete a merger, and the fact that the parties cannot prevent renegotiation of the initial contract given new information, opportunistic behavior (a "holdup")
is expected to arise during the bargaining process. Using an incomplete contracts framework, we build a multi-period model to demonstrate that, in order to solve holdup problems, the optimal contract imposes a cost for either side to terminate the merger. This provides a new rationale for the use of deal protection devices in initial merger agreements, including termination fees and lockup provisions.
A quandary within the incomplete contracts literature is that there are few empirical settings that provide an opportunity to test the otherwise abstract models by examining real contracts. 2 The process and features of mergers fit well with (but have not been examined within) this literature. 3 In this regard, our paper contributes to both the incomplete contracts and M&A literature, in that we derive testable implications that describe the M&A contracting environment in practice. Supporting 2 our model predictions, our empirical tests provide evidence on the renegotiation process, deal outcomes, and the determinants of the use of protection devices.
In our model, the acquirer exerts effort after the signing of the initial contract but before the completion or termination of the deal. In practice, much effort is expended during the time leading up to the deal closing. This takes the form both of completion of the due diligence process, and development of detailed plans regarding implementation of the merger. 4 Information generated during this process, as well as other changes in market conditions during this time, allow the bidder and target to improve the precision of prior information on the value of synergy, and can also reveal problems in the pending merger. The subsequent decision-whether to complete or terminate the deal based on posterior information (given the effort)-is more reliable than that based on prior information (and no effort). This effort is also "deal-specific" in the sense that the information obtained is only useful in evaluating the current transaction. At the same time, the target exerts effort to increase the expected value of its non-merger alternatives, including merging with another firm or remaining stand-alone.
Based on the new information, one or both firms may have the incentive to renegotiate the initial contract. For example, the target may behave opportunistically by demanding a higher offer price after information is revealed about synergies and non-merger alternatives. This "holdup" problem reduces the acquirer's ex ante incentive to exert deal-specific effort, which in turn lowers the expected merger synergy and payoffs of both firms. Similarly, the acquirer may behave opportunistically, depending on the effort expended by the target and the information revealed.
To solve the holdup problem, the ex ante optimal contract grants the target, and in some cases the acquirer, a 'call option' to forego the merger and instead pursue its best alternative. To prevent opportunistic behavior, the target must compensate the acquirer if the target terminates the deal (and vice versa if the acquirer terminates)-this is the strike price on the option. The optimal strike must 3 balance between compensating the other party's deal-specific effort and not imposing excessive costs for pursuing a more valuable non-merger alternative. With the optimal strike, merger contract and rules of renegotiation in place, both merging parties exert first-best efforts, and renegotiation of the initial contract leads to efficient ex post outcomes-a transaction is completed if and only if the realized merger synergy is higher than the target's best non-merger alternative.
The results from our model provide guidance for our empirical tests, which are based on a sample of more than 1,100 U.S. stock mergers announced between 1994 and 1999. While not highlighted by previous literature, in over 15% of our sample, the initial contract is either renegotiated or terminated. We provide descriptive evidence on the reasons leading to renegotiation or termination, which include bad news about the acquirer or target, the arrival of a competing bid, or external factors such as adverse rulings by courts or regulatory agencies. In the event of deal termination, we observe that the payment or waiver of deal protection devices depends on the nature of the information revealed. Further, in 79% of the subsample of renegotiated or terminated deals, the final outcome of the merger agrees with the outcome predicted by our model. We also use multinomial regressions to
show that variables related to the arrival of new information after the initial contracting have a significant impact on whether firms complete versus renegotiate or terminate the deal. These results support the hypothesis that, with optimal initial contracts, renegotiation ensures ex post efficiency.
Our second set of tests examines the use of deal protection devices in initial contracts. The strike price of the option-like contract in our model can be implemented by any of several protection devices. In fact, most deals in our sample are "protected" by one or more devices. The first device that helps to solve the target's holdup problem, used in 36% of our sample deals, is an acquirer's lockup option. This allows the acquirer to purchase a fraction of either the target's stock (share lockup) or assets (e.g., a division or segment; asset lockup) at a specified price, and becomes valuable when, for example, a rival bidder enters the control contest. The second device, which closely 4 resembles the strike price of the target's option, is a termination fee (TF hereafter) on the target side, or the amount the target must pay the acquirer upon a target initiated termination of the deal. In 56%
of the deals, a target TF is included, while in 22% of deals an acquirer TF is included in addition to the target TF. In less than 25% of deals, neither a TF nor a lockup is used. 5 A key implication of our model is that as the productivity of effort increases, or as effort becomes more deal specific, the use of deal protection devices is expected to increase to counteract a higher degree of holdup problem. We find that the use of deal protection devices is more common as the size of the acquirer increases, but becomes less likely as the acquirer becomes larger relative to the target. For more productive acquirers (proxied by the acquirer return on assets (ROA)), termination fees are more likely to be observed. Further, when the acquirer or target has been involved in similar acquisitions in the three year period prior to the current merger, suggesting that effort is less deal specific, termination fees on either side are less likely to be observed.
The final set of tests focuses on the size of target TFs, and examines our model's predictions on how the strike price of the target's option varies with deal and firm characteristics. We use crosssectional regressions to examine the size of the target TF, defined to be the percentage of dollar TF over deal value, controlling for the use of other protection devices. Similar to our results above, TFs are larger for more productive acquirers, but lower when the acquirer has previously purchased similar targets (i.e. less deal specific effort). We also find weaker evidence that target TFs are larger when the target has more intangible assets. These results are consistent with the comparative static predictions on the relation between the option strike and expected degree of holdup problem in our model.
Our paper relates to and extends previous research on contracting in mergers. One strand of 5 We also examine two additional deal protection devices. First, in more than 95% of the deals, the target professes that it will not solicit outside bids during negotiation with the acquirer ("no solicitation"). Interestingly, in most of these deals, an additional clause states that the target will enter into merger negotiations with unsolicited bidders, permitting the target to pursue more efficient outcomes ex post. Second, when the acquirer has a toehold (see, e.g., Betton and Eckbo 2000, Betton et al. 2009 , and Goldman and Qian 2005), or target shares purchased before merger announcement, it participates in the appreciation of the target stock even if the merger fails, and thus the holdup problem becomes less severe.
prior literature argues that the initial bidder's search and investigation of a potential target before making a bid creates a positive externality for subsequent bidders, as they can free-ride on the information conveyed by the first bid. 6 Similar to our model, deal protection devices can compensate for this externality and induce an optimal level of search activity (see also Gilson and Black 1995 and Weston et al. 2004 ). Our model offers a different and not mutually exclusive reason for the use of deal protection devices, based on the key assumption that information revealed after the signing of a definitive contract leads to a potential holdup problem during renegotiation. 7 Our empirical evidence confirms that new information released prior to deal completion or termination indeed drives the renegotiation process and final outcome of mergers. Moreover, in some deals that attract competing bids we find that both the initial and the competing bidders use a target TF. Prior theories cannot explain the use of a target TF by competing bidders, since the competing bidders are already the beneficiary of the initial bidder's (ex ante) search costs. 8 In contrast, the use of a target TF by the all the bidders is consistent with our theory of resolving holdup problems, which should be present in the initial and subsequent merger deals for the same target. Further, the use of TFs by the acquirer is difficult to explain within a search cost framework that looks at information revealed about the target, while the kind of holdup problems we model can occur on either the target or acquirer side. . These papers reject the hypothesis that deal protection devices 6 Earlier work considering costly search includes Easterbrook and Fischel (1982) , Bebchuk (1982) , and French and McCormick (1984) . Berkovitch et al (1989) and Berkovitch and Khanna (1990) argue that defensive strategies can serve as compensation to an initial bidder for the externality that their bid signals the existence of synergy gains to other bidders such that other potential bidders can free-ride on their information. 7 To our knowledge, the only other paper to consider the role of effort in the time period between a definitive merger agreement and deal closing is Gilson and Schwartz (2005) . They argue that "material adverse change" (MAC) clauses, which allow the acquirer to costlessly cancel the deal, encourage the target to take actions during this time that protect and enhance the expected value of the combined company. Our model has implications for both the MAC clauses, which are included in most deals, and deal protection devices that require payments and are used more often on the target side. 8 Indeed, Bates and Lemmon (2003, p. 481) suggest that "the costs associated with information acquisition and leakage for follow-on offers will be relatively low as compared to initial offers."
6 reflect an agency problem in which self-interested target managers discourage competition in control contests. Bates and Lemmon (2003) further suggest that deal protection devices can be used to lock in a proportion of expected gains to the target when deal completion is still uncertain. In contrast, we build a unified theory demonstrating that a number of protection devices observed in practice can be used to solve holdup problems during friendly mergers. We also model and empirically examine the impact of new information, the renegotiation process, and the ex post efficiency of merger outcomes.
In the context of ours and other related papers, several complementary and non-mutually exclusive theories can be offered to explain the variety of complex provisions observed in merger contracts. Our application of holdup problems to the M&A setting adds an important piece to our understanding of contracting and renegotiation that cannot otherwise be entirely explained. The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section II we first develop a general model to examine the merger process, and then derive closed-form solutions for the optimal contract and testable implications. Section III provides empirical evidence using our sample of stock mergers.
Section IV concludes and the Appendix contain all the proofs.
II. The Model of a Friendly Merger
The incomplete contracts literature generally concerns a bilateral trade of a product, where there are relationship-specific efforts that generate more value inside the trade than outside the trade.
The main problem is that opportunistic behaviors concerning the distribution of the benefits from relationship-specific efforts (holdup problem) may arise after the realizations of the value and costs of production are observed but prior to the completion of the trade.
A solution to the holdup problem is to design binding contracts; the task of designing contracts becomes straightforward if both the effort and the uncertainty in the value and cost of the product can be fully specified and verified by a third party. However, these assumptions are often unrealistic, and 7 the resulting incompleteness of contracts and opportunistic behavior leads to under-investment in relationship-specific efforts by one or both sides, which in turn lowers the payoffs of both parties. In practice, the holdup problem can be solved by ex ante contracts which specify the sharing rule of the total expected surplus from trade and allow for renegotiation after the uncertainty in trade conditions is resolved. Our model of mergers is based on some of the main developments in this recent literature.
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II.1 Elements of the Model
The merger process between a risk-neutral acquirer and target is depicted in Figure 1 . At t = 0, the merging parties decide whether and how to write a contract specifying the terms of a merger to be completed or terminated at a future date (t = 4); the prior signal on merger synergy is publicly observable. At t = 1, they make deal-specific effort choices that will affect the distributions of merger synergy (V) and the target's non-merger alternative (W). At t = 2, the posterior signal on merger synergy, sP, as well as new information on V and W are observed, and at t = 3, renegotiation of the initial contract based on the new information (revealed at t = 2) take place. Finally, at t = 4, the final merger decision (to complete or terminate the deal) is made and payoffs to both firms are realized. As mentioned earlier, the multi-period sequence of events, which allows for the release of new information and renegotiation following the signing of the initial contract, is an important distinction of our model from previous theories of mergers.
The expected synergy of the merger, above and beyond the combined market values of both firms, is denoted by
: A e is the acquirer's deal-specific effort choice made at t = 1, sP is the posterior signal on merger synergy observed at t = 2, and  is a random, state variable following a cumulative distribution function (cdf) F(· ) and its realization is also observed at t = 2. We assume that the mean of V is either positive v0 > 0, or negative -v0. The prior signal, available at t = 0 (without any 8 effort), is denoted s0 = (.5, .5), indicating that the mean of V is positive (v0) or negative (-v0) with equal probabilities. Hence, the prior signal is uninformative on the distribution of V. 
Figure 1 Merger Timeline
The acquirer's deal-specific effort, eA, includes the discovery and evaluation of possible sources of merger synergy. In particular, such effort includes the development of business and operation plans for the combined firm, plans for implementing the merger, and remaining due diligence, each of which may also reveal potential problems in the merger. Accordingly, we assume that the acquirer's effort improves the precision of the prior signal, in that given an effort level eA, the acquirer will observe a posterior signal (at t = 2), sP, in the form of: 
From the ex ante (t = 0) point of view, conditional on the effort, the acquirer receives a good posterior signal sg (a bad signal sb) half of the time, indicating that the mean of merger synergy is more likely to be positive, or v0 (negative, or -v0). We also assume that l() is increasing in eA, so that as the level of effort increases, the posterior signal becomes more precise about the mean value of synergy.
From the structure of both signals s0 and sP, it is clear that the acquirer's effort does not directly increase the mean of merger synergy (recall v0 is a constant), or the probability of receiving a good 9 posterior signal sg. 10 Instead, it improves the precision of both the good and bad posterior signals, so that merger decisions based on posterior signals are more reliable than those based on the prior signal.
The structure of the posterior signals also implies that there remains uncertainty about merger synergy at t = 3 (renegotiation stage); with risk neutrality, however, the value-maximizing decision would be to terminate the deal upon receiving sb. 11 The specifications of V also imply that the target does not contribute to expected synergy. As our empirical results illustrate below, deal protection devices are used much more often on the target side. In most cases, it is the acquirer, the larger of the two merging firms, that investigates the prospects and perform due diligence of the pending merger. This indicates that the holdup problem on the target side is likely to be more severe than that on the acquirer side.
We therefore focus on the acquirer's deal-specific effort in the model. However, our model can be extended to consider the case in which the target also exerts deal-specific effort to improve the precision of posterior signal; and hence there can be holdup problems on both sides.
Although the target does not contribute to merger synergy, its effort, T e , made at t = 1 (before the posterior signal is observed), does improve the (expected) best alternative if not merging with the acquirer (above and beyond the current market value). We denote this non-merger alternative by
, and it is increasing in T e . The target's effort in exploring non-merger options is triggered by the initial merger talks, and includes remaining stand-alone and identifying other firms as merger partners. 12 The random state variable, , follows a cdf G(· ), and its realization will be observed at t = 2. Finally,
denote the strictly increasing and convex cost functions of the efforts.
We first examine the First Best solution of the merger process. Following the incomplete 10 contract literature, this is equivalent to choosing optimal effort levels and maximizing the ex ante (t = 0) expected, joint surplus of the merging firms, net of costs of effort: . First, the term, Surplus(sg), denotes the gross expected surplus between the two firms conditional on receiving the good posterior signal (sg) on merger synergy (with probability 0.5); as the "max" operator inside the double integrals indicates, the First Best decision in this case is to complete the merger if and only if the realized value of the synergy, V, is larger than W, the target's best alternative. Second, the term Surplus(sb) denotes the expected surplus between the two firms conditional on receiving the bad posterior signal (with probability 0.5); as discussed before, the two sides should terminate the merger and the total surplus comes from the non-merger alternative, W. Finally, the "Max" operator in (2) implies that optimal effort choices maximize the expected joint surplus from the efficient merger decision, net of costs. Once First Best effort choices 
II.2 Solution to the Holdup Problem in Second Best
In second best situations, each of the merging firms seeks to maximize their respective expected payoffs from the merger. The goal of designing contracts at t = 0 is to ensure that both the acquirer and target's efforts and the total expected payoff are as close to the First Best level as Following the incomplete contracts literature, we assume a symmetric information structure (Assumptions 1a and 1b) to highlight the holdup problem on the acquirer's effort and its solutions.
This assumption is also justified by the fact that during the friendly merger process, management teams from both firms hold extensive conversations and exchange information about each other. We also assume (Assumption 1a) that the posterior signal on the mean of merger synergy is verifiable by a court. 13 As stated before, the acquirer's effort improves the precision of the prior signal without affecting the probabilities of receiving the good or bad posterior signal. In particular, the bad posterior signal (sb) implies that the mean of merger synergy is negative, and hence completing the deal would be a negative-NPV project for both sides. 14 Assuming both merging firms are profit-maximizing (there is no agency problem between managers and shareholders), mutually terminating the merger upon receiving sb is the best decision in both the First Best and second best situations. Since the posterior signal is verifiable, the ex ante contract can specify that the target pursues its non-merger alternative (W), which only depends on its effort (eT), without making any payment to the acquirer. As we observe from the merger documents of our sample, it is a standard practice that when the acquirer's stock price reaches a (pre-specified) termination range before the deal completion date, the deal is 12 terminated and no transfer or payment is made (i.e., all deal protection devices are void). If there is no ex ante contract, then the two sides can negotiate after the realizations of  and  to decide whether to merge and how to split the total surplus (e.g., via Nash bargaining). We show that efforts made at t = 1 without any contract signed at t = 0 (and sharing rules determined by ex post Nash bargaining) will be less than First Best levels, a result that is standard in the incomplete contracts literature. Prior research has also shown that in most cases the signing of a complete, state-contingent contract is not feasible. Hence, the question is whether any simple contract can induce the First Best efforts and merger outcome. In this regard, Aghion et al. (1994) provide the insight that one solution is to grant (ex ante) the right to make a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer and thus the residual claim of the total expected surplus to the party that will exert the relationship-specific effort. Under this sharing rule, the marginal value created by the relationship-specific effort will not be shared by the other party (and will be fully compensated), and hence the First Best effort choice is made. Within the canonical buyer- 15 Gilson and Schwartz (2005) study material adverse change (MAC) and material adverse effect (MAE) clauses in friendly mergers. They focus on actions taken by the target before deal closing to prevent a fall in value of the combined firm due to failure to maintain factories, retain the workforce, or preserve relationships with customers and suppliers. Thus, their model has implications for the inclusion of closing conditions in acquisition agreements. Our model focuses a different problem and considers effort of both the acquirer and the target.
seller model, Noldeke and Schmidt (1995) then show that an option-like contract can implement this sharing rule. In their model, the seller has a put option to sell the product to the buyer for a fixed price (the strike on the option) when the cost of production is low relative to the market value of the product (and profits can be made).
We build on the Aghion et al. (1994) sharing rule and the Noldeke and Schmidt (1995) optionlike contract to our M&A framework, as follows. The acquirer, who exerts deal-specific effort that improves the precision of information regarding the expected merger synergy, makes an offer to purchase the target's equity and/or assets and owns the residual claim of total surplus from the merger beyond the value of an 'option' granted to the target. The target's option allows it to walk away from the merger (at a cost), if doing so generates higher payoffs. Therefore, in our model the target has a call option with the underlying asset being the value of the target's best non-merger alternative (W).
It is important to note that the target's call option cannot be free, because without any cost of terminating the deal, it will behave opportunistically after the realizations of V and W. For example, the target can demand that the acquirer increases the target's share of the payoff (or merger synergy created by the acquirer's effort), or else it will withdraw from the merger. This holdup problem reduces the acquirer's incentive to exert costly effort at t=1. Therefore, the time 0 contract must have the target compensate the acquirer upon terminating the deal at t=3. This is the strike price (denoted by k) on the call option granted to the target. On the one hand, the strike must be high enough to motivate the acquirer's (First Best) effort; on the other hand, the strike cannot be too high or else the target loses the incentive to exert effort that increases W, which is also part of the total surplus of the two firms (recall that the acquirer has the residual claim on this total surplus).
We now formally describe the initial contract signed at t=0. Since the posterior signal on merger synergy is verifiable, this contract is contingent on this signal. When the bad signal is observed, the deal is terminated without further payments or transfer. When the good signal is observed, the contract includes the pair (p0, k). First, p0 is an initial constant payment to the target; a natural interpretation for p0 is the initial offer premium (in dollars) paid by the acquirer to the target over the target's current market value. In our model of symmetric information, we focus on the holdup problem and treat p0 as exogenous as in other incomplete contracts models. 16 Second, as stated above, the constant k is the strike price on the target's call option. Given the contingent option contract and (p0, k), the target's expected payoff (at t = 0), is:
The target maximizes its expected payoff by choosing the effort eT. The first term inside the bracket indicates the expected payoff conditional on receiving the good posterior signal on merger synergy. In this case, the target has the option-like contract with strike k; since k is a constant and merger synergy (V) is independent of eT, the target's effort choice is independent of the acquirer's. The second term inside the bracket of (3) denotes the target's expected payoff when the bad posterior signal is received.
In this case the target owns the entire non-merger alternative W.
The acquirer's expected payoff (at t=0), given the target's option and the sharing rule, is:
where the term Surplus(sg) is defined in (2) above, indicating the gross, joint surplus between the two firms conditional on receiving the good posterior signal (sg) on synergy. In this case, the acquirer owns the residual claim of the total expected surplus, or the difference between Surplus(sg) and the value of the call option it has granted to the target. When a bad posterior signal is received (with probability 0.5), however, the deal is terminated and the acquirer's payoff is 0. From (4), the acquirer's problem of choosing eA to maximize his expected payoff depends on the target's effort choice eT, which in turn depends on k. 17 Next, we derive payoffs of merging firms after the realizations of V and W are observed (t=2; effort choices and costs of effort are sunk at this point) and the outcome of merger (t=4).
Lemma 1 Given the time 0 contingent contract with an option-like component (p0, k), a) when sb is received the deal is terminated; the target's payoff is W and the acquirer gets 0;
b) conditional on sg (with ex ante probability 0.5), the target's payoff at t=4 is given by:
and the acquirer's payoff at t=2 is given by:
Finally, the merger will be completed at t=4 if and only if V ≥ W.
We focus on the case where the good posterior signal on synergy (sg) is observed. The target's payoff (excluding the cost of effort) is described in (5). Whenever
, that is, when the value of the non-merger alternative is greater than the sum of the initial offer premium and the strike price on the call option (of termination), the target exercises the (in-the-money) option and receives exactly W -k.
When the reverse is true, the target receives the constant payment p0. The acquirer's payoff, denoted in (6), depends on whether the target exercises the option (
, and whether the merger is 16 completed or not (V > W). Since the initial contract (specified in (4)) dictates that the acquirer holds the residual claim of the joint surplus [the term Surplus(sg)], the sum of the merging firms' payoffs at t = 4 is equal to either V if the merger is completed or W if the merger is terminated.
The acquirer's payoffs when the target exercises its option (and receives W -k) are more straightforward (denoted in the bottom two rows of (6)), and we examine these first. When V < W (third row of (6)), the merger is terminated and the acquirer receives the strike price (k) paid by the target. This case includes the possibility that the target receives another bid (after the signing of the initial contract) that is higher than the realization of V. As noted before, the payment of k must be made from the target and/or the outside bidder to the acquirer, or else the acquirer loses its incentive to exert First Best effort (
FB A e ). Notice that if V > k, the acquirer may want to complete the merger and deviate from the payoff of k specified in (6) ; since the target is guaranteed a payoff of W -k by exercising the option, the acquirer must offer the same amount to convince the target to complete the deal, but this is not profitable because
When V > W > 0 p + k (last row of (6)), with a high realization of V the acquirer can raise the final offer to the target from p0 to W -k, the amount that the target would receive from the non-merger alternative, and convince the target to complete the merger while capturing the residual claim of (V -
by sweetening the deal and completing the merger the acquirer does better than allowing the target to terminate the deal.
Next, the top two rows of (6) represent the acquirer's payoffs when the target's option is not exercised (and it receives the constant p0). When V > W but W -k < p0 (second row of (6)), the merger is completed and the acquirer does not alter the initial offer of p0 because the target's option is out-of-money and worthless. When W > p0, the target may want to terminate the deal and earn W instead; however, the threat of termination is not credible, because it has to pay k to the acquirer to break up the deal, but since W -k < p0, the target's payoff from merging with the acquirer is higher than that from terminating.
Finally, the case of V < W and W -k < p0 (first row of (6)) is more complicated. On the one hand, the merger should not be completed from an ex-post efficiency standpoint. On the other hand, the target's option is out-of-money so its threat of termination is not credible. According to the option contract and the sharing rule that the acquirer receives the residual claim of the total surplus, the target receives p0 while the acquirer gets W -p0. Unlike the previous three cases, where we have shown there will be no ex post bargaining and thus no deviation from the payoffs specified in Lemma 1, both sides may have an incentive to revise the initial contract in the current case (See Appendix A.1 for more details). For example, if W > p0 the target has a strong incentive to renegotiate, because it is paying the acquirer an amount of W -p0 even though the merger is terminated. When the opposite is true (W < p0), the acquirer wants to renegotiate as it is paying the target an amount of p0 while incurring a loss of p0 -W despite deal termination. In practice we typically observe the payoff pair of Finally, we derive the optimal k * that induces First Best efforts in second best. From the target's effort choice problem specified in (3), the first order condition yields its optimal effort choice as a function of k. We can equate this effort choice to that of the First Best effort choice, and find an optimal k * that induces the target to provide First Best effort. Then, given that the optimal k * from the 
II.3 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
Having derived the general procedure to solve for the optimal strike price k * and effort choices, we next present a specific example of our model, and derive testable implications. As 
Assumption 2 Conditional on sg, the merger synergy is
Proposition 2 states that a properly chosen strike price on the target's option (second best contract) induces First Best efforts by solving the holdup problem. It is important to emphasize that in our model, the goal of designing time 0 contracts is to maximize the expected joint surplus, not the probability of completing the merger. In particular, when the merger synergy is expected to be low relative to that of the target's non-merger alternative, the contract should not force a merger with the acquirer or impose excessive costs to withdraw.
Corollary 1
The optimal strike, k * , increases as  increases, or as lA increases.
As  (twice the mean of the state variable of merger synergy V) or lA (the productivity of acquirer's deal-specific effort) increases, the acquirer's role in increasing total surplus becomes more important because merger synergy is expected to be higher. Therefore, in order to induce the efficient First Best efforts and outcome, the option contract should impose a higher cost, i.e. a higher k * , on the target to withdraw from the merger, so as to compensate the acquirer's effort. A higher strike also increases the probability of merger completion, ceteris paribus, but this is optimal because merger (rather than the target's best non-merger alternative) is more likely to be the First Best outcome.
Corollary 2
The optimal strike, k * , decreases as  increases, or as hT increases.
As  (twice the mean of the state variable of target's non-merger alternative W) or hT (the productivity of target's effort) increases, the value of the target's non-merger alternative is expected to increase relative to merger synergy, and thus her role in increasing total surplus becomes more important.
Therefore, the second best contract should impose lower costs on the target, or a lower k * , to withdraw from the merger and induce First Best effort. A lower strike also decreases the likelihood of completion of the merger, but this is again optimal because the First Best outcome is now more likely coming from the target's best non-merger alternative. In the next section, we provide empirical tests to examine predictions of Corollaries 1 and 2.
III. Empirical Evidence
We conduct two sets of empirical tests to examine predictions of our model. First, our model highlights the importance of new information revealed after the signing of the initial contract, which can trigger renegotiation of the initial contract and lead to different outcomes of the M&A deal.
Accordingly, we examine the impact of new information on deal outcome, reasons for contract renegotiation, and whether renegotiation leads to ex post efficient outcome predicted by the model (in 21 particular, Lemma 1). Second, our model demonstrates that a properly designed, option-like contract can solve the holdup problem during renegotiation and induce First Best efforts in improving merger synergy and non-merger alternatives. We show that a critical element of the contract, the optimal strike on either merging firm's option to terminate the merger, can be implemented by a number of deal protection devices in practice. We examine and relate the likelihood of one or more deal protection devices used in a deal to the degree of the holdup problem and the relative importance of deal-specific efforts from the acquirer vs. the target. We also examine the comparative statics of the model (Corollaries 1 and 2) by regressing the size of the target TF, one of the deal protection devices, on measures of deal-specific efforts while controlling for the use of other devices.
III.1 Description of Sample and Deal Protection Devices
Our sample is based on all U.S. mergers announced between January 1994 and December 1999 that are included in the Security Data Corporation (SDC) database. To ensure accuracy, all information on deal protection devices and merger outcomes is obtained from SEC filings (which date back to 1994 electronically) and the Dow Jones Interactive company filings database. We exclude allcash mergers in this period because many of these deals were hostile takeovers, in which a target's holdup opportunity would not exist. 18 This results in an initial sample of 1,583 stock merger deals.
We exclude deals with transactions values under $10 million, and where the target or acquirer is not included on CRSP and Compustat in the fiscal year end prior to the announcement of an agreement.
Unlike previous work, we also exclude deals that do not have an initial definitive agreement -without a formal agreement, there is no binding mechanism in place to prevent opportunistic behavior during negotiation. Not surprisingly, none of these deals are completed.
Our final sample of consists of 1,104 deals, with an average time between the definitive agreement and the deal outcome of 5.4 months. As mentioned earlier, target TFs are used in 56% of 22 all deals. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of all non-zero target TFs, as a fraction of deal size. TFs are economically large; for the non-zero observations, the mean target TF is 3.01% of deal size, or $55.32 million in dollar amount. Acquirer TFs are included in 22% of all deals -acquirer TFs are never observed without a target TF. 19 When they are present, acquirer TFs average $74 million, and are on average the same size as the target TF for those deals. As noted above, the use of TFs on the acquirer side is difficult to explain within a search cost framework, as the acquirer is not revealed as a potential target to another bidder. Table 1 also shows that acquirer lockups, providing for the purchase of shares or assets of the target in the event the deal is not completed, are present in 36% of deals, and are more common after 1996. The use of an acquirer lockup can partially substitute for a TF, particularly when there are costs to imposing a large, cash TF on the target. For example, when the target is in the banking industry, acquirer lockups are used more frequently than target TFs, in part because committing to cash TFs is costly for targets which are required to maintain cash reserves to meet regulatory capital requirements.
Target lockups, providing for the purchase of acquirer assets by the target, are less frequently used (less than 8% of deals).
We also manually search for "no solicitation" clauses in online SEC filings (forms 8-K or S-4) for each deal. Among the 960 deals for which we can find online filings, this clause is included in 948 deals. Moreover, for more than 96% of these deals, there is an additional clause immediately following the no solicitation clause, stating that while the target does not solicit bids itself, it can enter into merger negotiations with unsolicited bidders and provide private information to the rival bidders. Consistent with our model, the combination of these two clauses can help the target to commit not to hold up the acquirer, but we do not include them in our tests due to the lack of variation across deals.
Our empirical results do not change when we exclude the few transactions without these provisions.
23
Finally, a toehold can solve the target's holdup problem by making the target's threat of termination less effective, and hence is a substitute for other deal protection devices. Very few acquirers in our sample of stock mergers have a positive toehold at the date of the initial agreement.
When they do exist (31 deals), their average size is large (mean 20%, median 18.5%).
The last three columns of Table 1 
III.2 Deal Outcomes
A key assumption of our model is that new information about the merger arrives after the initial contract is signed and effort choices are made and that this new information directly triggers renegotiation and affects the final outcome of the merger. Therefore, we provide empirical tests that examine the impact of information revealed after the definitive agreement on the deal outcome. 20 For the deals that are renegotiated or terminated, we collect information from news articles and final merger agreements on reasons for the contract amendment or termination. Table 2 -A shows that the reasons for renegotiation include adverse price changes, news about the target and/or the acquirer, a competing bid for the target, and exogenous factors such as rulings by regulatory agencies. Table 2-B shows similar explanations for deal terminations, and also shows whether the TF payments are made.
In all 15 cases where the target receives a higher competing bid, the target initiates termination; in 12 24 of these 15 cases, the target TF is paid by the winning bidder. On the other hand, in 6 out of 8 deals that are struck down by a court or regulator, both sides agree to terminate and the TFs are waived. The enforcement and waiver of TFs demonstrates efficient ex post bargaining: the TF payment from a rival bidder to the acquirer is economically sensible because it compensates for the initial bidder's dealspecific effort and resolves the holdup problem on the target side. Notably, when the target enters a new merger agreement, it frequently includes a target TF, suggesting the purpose of the TF is not solely to compensate the initial bidder for search costs in the event a rival bidder subsequently appears.
We also provide descriptive evidence related to the ex post efficiency of renegotiations in Table   3 , which compares the actual outcome to the prediction of our model. Since our goal is to examine the outcome of renegotiation, we do not include deals that are completed without any revision of the initial contract (leaving us with 145 deals that are either renegotiated or terminated). 21 We include terminated deals because the decision to terminate follows an unsuccessful attempt to renegotiate.
Recall that the optimal contract in the model (Lemma 1) allows for renegotiation, which leads to an efficient final outcome of the merger. Specifically, at the time of deal termination or completion, a completed merger is ex post efficient if V ≥ W, where V is the updated value of synergy and W is the target's non-merger alternative; otherwise the merger should be terminated. Since the (final) total offer price is the total payment that the acquirer is willing to pay the target to complete the merger and it often contains a premium over target price, it reflects the updated value of merger synergy. To measure the target's best possible non-merger alternative, we use the maximum of target's market value at the time of amendment (or termination) and the highest competing bid. 22 Using this procedure, Table 3 shows that V ≥ W in 100 out of the 145 deals. Our model 21 We exclude an additional 25 terminated deals because the termination is caused by external factors such as the ruling of a court or regulatory agency. 22 In our model, V denotes merger synergy net of the sum of the two firms' stand alone values, while W is the non-merger alternative net of the target's stand alone value prior to the initial deal announcement. In Table 3 , we use gross values for merger synergy and non-merger alternative, which can be obtained from V and W through a linear transformation; hence our empirical measures are consistent with the model notations (see Appendix A.3 for the linear transformation).
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predicts that these deals should be completed as a result of ex post efficient renegotiation. 78 of the 100 deals are in fact completed, suggesting that our model prediction has an accuracy of 78%. In some cases, the target receives an outside bid following the signing of an initial agreements, but in the end the (initial) acquirer revises its bid upward and the deal is completed. This corresponds to the case of V > W > 0 p + k (last row of (5)) in Lemma 1. 23 Of the 22 deals where V ≥ W but the deal is not completed as predicted, only 3 involved competing offers; however, in each case the original bidder raised its offer price above the competing bid. Therefore, the 22 deals are not completed because of reasons 1 or 2 in Panel B of Table 2 -most often because of an unexpected loss reported by the acquirer (and therefore a decline in the acquirer stock price).
For the remaining 45 deals, we observe that V < W. According to our model, these should be terminated -37 deals are in fact terminated, an accuracy of 82%. One reason for deviations of merger outcomes from those predicted by Lemma 1 lies in possibly inefficient ex post bargaining. Of the 8 deals not correctly classified in row (2) of Table 3 , only one involved an outside bidder, and the deal was approved by the target board despite the fact that the acquirer's final offer was below that of the outside bid. 24 The less-than-perfect accuracy of our model prediction for the remaining 7 deals is likely due to the accuracy of our empirical measures for V and W. For these deals, we use the updated offer price/deal value to proxy for V and the market value of the target to proxy for W. potentially change the relationship between (true) V and W. In these cases, we observe the target stock price remains slightly higher (up to $2.50 higher) than the offer price at the time of the amendment.
There may also be non-monetary differences between bids (financing contingencies or requirements to sell certain assets for example), or differences in tax consequences to shareholders which are not accounted for in our measures of V and W. Overall, our model correctly predicts the final outcome in 79% of deals, and the observed outcomes are consistent with ex post efficiency following renegotiation of an initial contract.
To examine the impact of information revealed subsequent to the signing of an initial agreement, Table 4 regarding the firms and the merger arises after the deal is announced, and is associated with a higher probability that a deal is terminated. A one standard deviation increase in  acquirer return SD increases the probability of deal termination by 2.5% (2.3%) in model 1(model 2). A one standard deviation increase in  target return SD increases the probability of deal termination by 2.3% (2.2%)
in Model 1 (Model 2).
We also use the acquirer and target cumulative abnormal stock returns from after the initial agreement date to the completion, termination, or renegotiation date as a measure of the information revealed during this period (acquirer CAR and target CAR). If the market reassesses the target stock (and merger synergy) downward following the initial announcement (a lower target CAR), the deal is more likely to be terminated or renegotiated. We test further in Model 2 whether the impact of the CAR is greater when the acquirer or target is expected to have a higher productivity of effort, proxied by the acquirer or target's pre-announcement industry adjusted return on assets (ROA); this provides weaker evidence (significant at the 10% level) that when there is bad news about the target (negative target CAR = 1), higher productivity acquirers are more likely to terminate, and when there is bad news about the acquirer (negative acquirer CAR = 1), higher productivity targets are more likely to renegotiate. Overall, the variables measuring new information revealed after the initial agreement significantly affect the likelihood of whether the initial contract is completed versus terminated or renegotiated.
The second set of explanatory variables in these regressions controls for deal and firm characteristics observed prior to or at the time of the initial agreement, and includes variables considered in previous studies to be determinants of deal completion. When the log ratio of the acquirer's market capitalization to that of the target [log(relative size)] increases, the deal is less likely to be terminated. In Model (2), higher productivity targets (higher target ROA) are associated with less renegotiation, but more renegotiation when the acquirer CAR is negative (see above). We also control for whether the target is a bank (see DeLong 2001); all of our main empirical results are robust to tests performed only using non-bank mergers.
The third set of explanatory variables in Table 4 controls for the contract features, specifically the use of TFs and lockups as deal protection devices. The presence of an acquirer TF reduces the probability of termination by 2.3% in either model, but is not significantly related to the probability of renegotiation (recall that for our sample, an acquirer TF is never present without a target TF). Target TF is not significant in any specifications. 25 A target lockup (giving the target the ability to purchase acquirer stock or assets) reduces the probability of renegotiation (but not of termination) by 6.5% in both models. Thus, the deal protection devices appear to have only a weak affect, and only in cases where these devices are included on both sides of the transaction. The general lack of an observed relationship between the presence of deal protection devices and outcomes is consistent with our model: the goal of designing time 0 contracts is to maximize expected joint surplus in the presence of holdup problems, not to maximize the probability of completing the merger. When the merger synergy is expected to be low relative to that of the target's non-merger alternative, the contract should not force a merger with the acquirer or impose excessive costs to withdraw.
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III.3 The Use of Deal Protection Devices
Our remaining tests examine the use of deal protection devices (excluding the "no solicitation"
clause) in initial merger agreements. Table 5 reports acquirer and target firm characteristics for the sample deals, sorted by their use of these devices. We first group deals by whether they are "protected" by either a TF or an acquirer lockup, or "unprotected" (Panel A); we then group deals by their use of TFs (Panel B) and by whether an acquirer lockup is used (Panel C). As mentioned above, 75% of all deals are protected by either a TF or an acquirer lockup. In 56% of deals, a target TF is used and in 22% of deals an acquirer TF is also used (again, there is no deal in which only an acquirer TF is used). 36% of deals have an acquirer lockup. 25 The difference in the impact of target TFs from previous literature is due to our exclusion of terminated deals that did not have an initial definitive agreement. When we add back these deals, our results are qualitatively similar to Bates and Lemmon (2003) and Officer (2003) -specifically, the use of a target TF increases the probability of deal completion. 26 In a previous version of this paper, we examined additional contract features including Fixed Exchange Ratio (FEX) offers, in which each share of the target stock is exchanged for a fixed number of acquirer shares, and Fixed Payment (FP) offers, in which the total amount of the transaction is fixed but the exchange ratio floats. Relative to the FEX contract, the use of FP contract increases the probability of renegotiation but not of termination. Similar to the empirical work of Officer (2004) , these results are consistent with Hart (2009) who argues that a rigid ex ante contract can provide reference points in renegotiation when there is payoff uncertainty.
Both the acquirer and the target are larger in the protected group than in the unprotected group (Panel A): the median market value of targets in the unprotected group ($86 million) is significantly less than that of the protected group ($211 million). Since the relative size of the merging firms' market values proxies for their bargaining positions in the stock-based merger, the holdup problem is not likely to be severe for relatively smaller targets. The protected deals contain many "mergers of equals"; when the size of the target is comparable to that of the acquirer, the target's contribution to merger synergy cannot be ignored, and the acquirer has an incentive to hold up the target. Thus, TFs are expected on both sides. When the acquirer is much larger than the target, the holdup problem likely exists on the target side only. Accordingly, TFs are expected only on the target side. Table 5 also presents statistics on two other firm characteristics (prior to deal announcement), both of which are industry adjusted. First, high (low) book-to-market ratio firms (B/M) are more value (growth) oriented. On average, the sample acquirers (targets) are more likely to be growth (value)
firms. This is not surprising given the time period of our sample coincides with the rise of growth firms, and firms take advantage of their highly valued equity to acquire (value) targets. Second, both the acquirers and targets on average have higher return on assets (ROA) in protected deals than in unprotected deals.
An alternative explanation for the presence of a TF is to compensate the first bidder for the costs of identifying a valuable target, in the event a competing bidder subsequently enters. Since the first bidder's information becomes public at the announcement of a deal, a competing bidder can free ride on the information produced by the first bidder. 15 deals in our sample are terminated due to a competing offer. Interestingly, we observe that the new contract with the competing bidder typically includes a target TF; these deals are described in Table 6 . This suggests that compensation for search costs cannot entirely explain the use of deal protection devices such as TFs (see Weston et al., 2004) .
In contrast, the use of a target TF by all the bidders is consistent with our theory of resolving holdup 30 problems, which should be present in the initial and subsequent merger deals for the same target.
The multinomial logistic regressions in Table 7 examine determinants of the use of deal protection devices (excluding the "no solicitation clause") for our sample of deals with definitive agreements. Panel A considers the use of TFs and lockups to alleviate target holdup of the acquirer, while Panel B considers holdup concerns and the use of TFs on both sides (we do not observe the use of lockups on both sides). The regressions control for the presence of a toehold, which generally is not significant. As described above, banks are less likely to use TFs relative to lockups.
Larger acquirers (log of acquirer MV) are associated with increased use of these devices. As the target becomes smaller relative to the acquirer, indicating less bargaining power of the target, we are less likely to observe protection devices on either side. When the size of the acquirer and target are more equal [a decrease on log (relative size)], TFs on both sides are more likely (Panel B).
We proxy for the productivity of effort by the acquirer and target ROA; acquirer ROA is associated with greater use of TFs. An increase in target ROA, however, decreases the probability of TFs on both sides. A higher preannouncement standard deviation of returns of the acquirer, suggesting less productive effort in investigating the acquirer, lowers the probability of TFs on both sides (indicating holdups of the target are less important).
When effort is less deal specific, holdup problems are expected to be less severe. We measure deal specific effort using the variable Acquirer's past deals (as well as target past deals to consider holdups on both sides), indicating the number of prior acquisitions in the past 3 years by the acquirer (or target) of other firms in the same industry as the target (or acquirer). 27 Consistent with our predictions, prior acquisitions of similar firms are associated with a lower probability of deal protection devices. We also control for the correlation of pre-announcement stock returns of the target and acquirer, which is generally not significant.
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Lastly, in Table 8 we provide additional tests of the predictions of our model (Corollaries 1 and 2) by studying the determinants of the size of target TFs, which is not examined in previous papers.
As discussed above, our model describes the optimal strike of the target's option. Since the target TF is the most widely used device, we use Tobit regressions to explain target TF size, calculated as the dollar amount of the target TF over the initially announced deal size. We include our proxies for the productivity of effort and the deal specificity of effort. All other firm and deal characteristics are obtained prior to or at the announcement of the initial agreement. We also include dummy variables for lockups and toeholds as controls. As a substitute in resolving holdups, the use of an acquirer lockup (acquirer can purchase target assets) reduces the size of the TF. TFs for bank targets are also significantly lower.
Related to the predictions of our model, higher productivity of effort (higher Acquirer ROA) is associated with a larger TF. We also expect that less deal specific effort is associated with a lower TF; consistent with our previous results, our strongest finding is that when the acquirer has previously completed transactions involving similar targets, the TF size is lower. Further, when the target has more intangible assets (Target intangible increases), the acquirer's effort in the current deal becomes more deal specific, and thus the size of the target TF is expected to be larger. The results in Table 8 are weakly supportive of this.
We also include (Models 2 and 4) a measure for the degree of agency problems in the acquirer, Acquirer CEO tenure, as available from Execucomp. It has no significant impact on the size of target TF, challenging the agency problem-driven motive for using a target TF. Lastly, Delaware firms are known to design corporate charters to facilitate takeovers (e.g., Daines 2001); a properly designed target TF provides the correct incentives for both firms to complete the merger. We find that the size of the target TF increases if either merging firm is incorporated in Delaware (dummies =1).
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IV. Summary and Conclusion
Our paper is the first to utilize the incomplete contracts framework to examine the renegotiation process and holdup problems in mergers. We first develop a model demonstrating that the signing of an initial contract can solve holdup problems and induce higher deal-specific effort that includes due diligence assessment of the merger. This contract includes the granting of an option to the target to withdraw from the merger, where the strike price compensates the acquirer's deal-specific effort without imposing excessive costs on the target for pursuing non-merger alternatives. In practice, the optimal strike on target's option can be implemented by the use of deal protection devices including termination fees, lockups, and no-solicitation provisions.
Using a large sample of stock mergers from 1994 to 1999, we provide empirical evidence supporting our model predictions. First, understanding the nature of information revealed subsequent to the signing of the initial agreement is extremely important in explaining final deal outcomes. We document the frequency and reasons for renegotiation of the initial merger agreement, and provide evidence on the determinants of the deal outcomes which is consistent with ex post efficiency.
Second, we examine the characteristics of determinants of the use of deal protection devices. We show that the use of one or more protection devices is more likely when a transaction requires more dealspecific effort on the part of the acquirer. An alternative search cost-based explanation does not appear sufficient to explain the use of these devices. Controlling for the use of other protection devices, we also find that the size of the target termination fee is larger when the holdup problem is likely to be more severe. Overall, our model and evidence demonstrate how efficient contracts can be designed and implemented in light of the complexities of the bargaining and renegotiation process in mergers. 
Given the functional forms specified in Assumptions 2-4, we have: Taking first order conditions w.r.t. eA and eT (and using the Leibniz' rule) yields the expressions above. Finally, the comparative statics on optimal effort levels can be derived based on Assumption 4. ■
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
The expected utilities of the acquirer and the target are given by:
If we redefine 
Since the newly defined Ṽ and W are simply linear transformation from V and W, they should take the same functional forms as V and W (specified in Assumption 2). For simplicity, we drop the notation "~" from Ṽ and W in the following proofs, while we keep the original definition for V and W in the main text. Given an option contract 0 p and k, the target chooses And since the first-order condition with respect to A e is the same as that in first-best situation, the acquirer's optimal effort level in the second-best situation, Notes: (1) There are an additional 25 deals in the V  W category, but they were terminated due to exogenous forces such as the ruling of a court or regulatory agency. These deals are excluded when we measure the precision of model prediction. (2) There are 9 deals that belong to both the contract amendment sample and the deal termination sample.
a : In some cases, the target receives an outside bid following the signing of the initial agreement, but the initial acquirer revises the bid upward and the deal is eventually completed. This efficient renegotiation process yields the First Best merger outcome, corresponding to the case of V > W > 0 p + k (last row of (5)) in Lemma 1. Of the 22 deals where V ≥ W but the deal is not completed as predicted, only 3 involved competing offers; however, in each case the original bidder raised its offer price above the competing bid. The most frequently mentioned reason for the termination of the 22 deals is an unexpected loss reported by the acquirer (and therefore a decline in the acquirer stock price). 
Table 5 Summary Statistics on the Use of Deal Protection Devices
This table reports mean (median) summary statistics for our sample of stock mergers grouped by the use of protection devices in the initial definitive agreement. In Panel A, in each protected deal either a TF or an acquirer's lockup is used, while neither a TF nor a lockup is used in unprotected deals. In Panel B, we group deals by TFs: In Group 1, TFs are included for both the acquirer and target; in Group 2, a TF is only included on the target side; in Group 3, TFs are not used on either side. In Panel C, we group the deals by whether an acquirer lockup is used or not. Acq.TF (Target TF) is the amount of TF on the acquirer side (target side), measured in $ millions. Acq. MV (Target MV) is the acquirer's (target's) market value of equity, measured in $ millions. Acq. B/M (target B/M) is the industry-adjusted book-to-market ratio for the acquirer (target). Acq. ROA (Target ROA) is the industry-adjusted return on assets for acquirer (target). All accounting data are obtained from Compustat for the fiscal year-end prior to the initial definitive merger agreement. 
Table 6 Use of Termination Fees in Original Contracts and New Contracts with Competing Bidders
In our sample, 15 deals are withdrawn due to offers from competing bidders. We are able to locate the new merger agreements between the target and the competing bidder for 12 of these failed deals. This table presents the use of TF in merger agreements between the target and its original acquirer (denoted as (1)) and between the target and the new bidder (denoted as (2) 
